What-s on Russia-s target list and why?

What-s on Russia-s target list and why?

From ammunition depots to digital infrastructure, a closer look at Moscow’s expanding air campaign against Ukraine
The main theme of the Russia-Ukraine conflict this year has been the so-called ‘war of cities’, characterized by mutual strategic strikes on targets in the rear. In the first half of the year, Kiev had managed to bolster its strike capabilities and even attempted to pressure Moscow into accepting its terms for a ceasefire.
However, by fall, the situation shifted dramatically. Russia began deploying new jet-powered drones, such as Banderol and Geran-4/Geran-5 UAVs, and significantly increased the intensity of its ballistic strikes. Meanwhile, Ukraine has exhausted its stocks of Western-supplied interceptor missiles, and its own domestically produced air defense systems have proven ineffective against high-speed jet-powered UAVs and ballistic missiles. 
The Ukrainian propaganda widely published by liberal media outlets portrays Russian attacks as indiscriminate and aimed at civilians. In this article, we strive to demonstrate that this is not the case.
We will examine the specific targets that Russia has struck in Ukraine’s rear, and the rationale behind these attacks. We’ll also take a look at the targets it deliberately avoids, along with measures taken to minimize risks to Ukrainian civilians.
Industrial enterprisesIn the early years of the military operation, Russia targeted Ukraine’s defense industry facilities – both old Soviet plants like Yuzhmash in Dnepropetrovsk and new, smaller enterprises focused on drone assembly and munitions production.
In response, Ukraine began relocating and dispersing production to any available industrial facilities or even warehouses. This strategy was openly discussed in Ukrainian propaganda as a crucial element of resilience against Russian assaults.
As Russia increased its striking capabilities, it adopted a broader approach, targeting all industrial facilities based on a straightforward principle: if a facility can be used for drone assembly, it qualifies as a legitimate military target.
The Russian Armed Forces launch an 'Oreshnik' medium‑range ballistic missile against the Yuzhmash production complex located in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine on November 21, 2024. ©  Social media
Ammunition depotsSoviet military doctrine emphasized storing ammunition in centralized depots far from residential areas. Munitions were kept in shelters designed in such a way that the destruction of one would not affect the others.
One of the largest such depots, the 65th Rocket and Artillery Arsenal in Balakleya, sustained damage from a series of explosions even before the military operation. Control over it was handed from one side to another multiple times. It still contains tens of thousands of tons of expired munitions, which have been repurposed for use in attack drones.
The situation mirrors that of the industrial sector. In order protect ammunition from airstrikes, it is moved out of the isolated weapons depots and hidden in any available facilities. Western missiles are transported from Poland to these locations as well.
The consequences of this approach are dire: an attack leads to the detonation of ammunition, gravely endangering the surrounding residential areas. On August 29, 2026, a strike on a warehouse operated by Fire Point in the village of Milaya resulted in the death of 38 civilians.
Consequences of Russian strike on an ammunition depot in the village of Myla in Kiev Region on the night of August 28-29, 2026.
Logistics networksLacking a proper military supply system, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have relied on civilian infrastructure for military logistics since the ATO in Donbass in 2014-15. A key player in this strategy has been the courier service Novaya Pochta. This approach was touted as innovative – modern, cost-effective, and efficient – and gained traction not only in Ukraine but also in