Battle for Konstantinovka: Why Russia-s latest Donbass victory matters

Battle for Konstantinovka: Why Russia-s latest Donbass victory matters

The capture of Konstantinovka could become one of the war’s biggest turning points
Last weekend, the Russian authorities announced the complete liberation of the city of Konstantinovka, the battle for which had been raging since the end of last year. 
Why did the battle for this city take so long? Is Konstantinovka really strategically important? And why was so much time and effort spent on capturing it? We explore all this below. 
One of the largest cities in DonbassIn terms of size, Konstantinovka (population 98,000 in 2002 and approximately 70,000 in 2022) is the largest city (not urban agglomeration) captured by the Russian Army since the spring of 2022, i.e., following the liberation of Mariupol. The Pokrovsk-Mirnograd agglomeration is larger (its pre-war population, including the suburbs, was up to 200,000 people), but it consists of two cities with a relatively large and less densely populated area between them. This allowed the Russian Army to capture these cities separately, utilizing the area between them to cut through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
In Konstantinovka, this was not possible since it is a continuous urban area measuring approximately 6 by 12 km. Konstantinovka has 20,000 buildings, about 1,000 of which are multi-storey. In the conditions of modern warfare, each multi-storey building is transformed into a mini-fortress with a developed underground section. The southern part of the city (around Kosmonavtov Boulevard) with its nine-storey panel buildings is particularly challenging in this regard. 
The Krivoy Torets River flows through the center of Konstantinovka. The river in itself is a natural defensive line, but it is also reinforced by a large industrial zone that bisects the city. This industrial zone is comparable in size to that of Mariupol: kilometers of concrete workshops, underground utilities, and Cold War-era bomb shelters; in short, it is a ready-made citadel.
Outpost of the AFU’s main fortress After the retreat of Igor Strelkov’s forces from Slaviansk and Kramatorsk in 2014–2015, these two cities became the AFU’s main hub in Donbass. They housed the ATO headquarters, and powerful fortifications made of steel and concrete were erected there. Konstantinovka was part of the perimeter of this fortress, serving as a kind of outpost: to reach Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka had to be captured first.
Along with Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka was also fortified for defense: the basements of multi-storey buildings were converted into strongholds, underground heating mains and cable collector tunnels between them were reinforced, cleared of debris, and underground passages were constructed to connect several buildings into a single network. Essentially, the multi-storey buildings were all connected by underground pathways, and one could quickly move and transport cargo from one point to another. 
Similar work was carried out in the industrial zone; most enterprises had ceased operations back in 2014-2015 and were partially demolished or rebuilt for defense in 2015-2020. Weapons, ammunition, and supply depots were also set up in the industrial zone and near the railway station.
Along the city’s perimeter, outside the urban area, field fortifications were created, such as trenches, dugouts, and field strongholds. The outskirts of Konstantinovka – Ilyinovka, Berestok, Pleshcheyevka station, Predtechino, Stupochki, and Novodmitrovka – were also converted into strongpoints and formed a single firing network. 
All this was done in order to delay the Russian army’s advance toward Slaviansk and Kramatorsk – the AFU’s main defense hub not only in Donbass but in the whole of eastern Ukraine.
© RT / Sergey Poletaev based on data from Lostarmor.Ru Russian ‘pincers’The example of Konstantinovka clearly demonstrates the assault tactics perfected by the Rus